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IV 
JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Appellees (the "Gendrons") respectfully disagree with Appellant's ("Puttuck") 
statement of the issues. Instead of the numerous issues Puttuck identifies in his brief, the 
Gendrons contend there are only two issues in this case. 
Issue No. I: Does Puttuck's complaint state a claim for relief under Utah law? 
(Add. at 159.) 
Standard of Review: "[A]n appellate court must accept the material allegations of 
the complaint as true" and will affirm the trial court's ruling "if it clearly appears the 
complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims." Mackey v. Cannon, 
2000 UT App 36, f 9, 996 P.2d 1081 (quotations and citation omitted). "The propriety of 
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) is a 
question of law that we review for correctness." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). 
See also, Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Issue No. 2: Did the district court judge abuse his discretion by denying Puttuck's 
request to amend his complaint? (Add. at 164.) 
Standard of Review: "'We will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
amend a complaint absent a clear abuse of discretion.'" Holmes Development, LLC v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 56, 48 P.3d 895 (quoting Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922 
(Utah 1994)). 
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GOVERNING LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
determinative of or of central importance to the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
The Gendrons agree with the procedural history recited in Puttuck's brief. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Peter Gendron, with others not parties to this action ("Owners"), hired Puttuck to 
construct a home in Park City, Utah. (Add. at 162-163.) The Owners terminated Puttuck 
before the home was finished and replaced him with John Hale. (Add. at 163.) Puttuck 
filed an action against the Owners to recover amounts allegedly owed on the project 
("Puttuck F). (Add. at 163.) Only one of the Owners, LRG, Inc., asserted counterclaims 
against Puttuck for cost overruns. (Add. at 49-66, 163; Puttuck Brief at xiii.) The parties 
settled all claims in that case and it was dismissed with prejudice. (Add. at 34-35, 163.) 
Hale subsequently filed an action against the Gendrons and LRG, Inc. ("Hale"), which 
was resolved by a jury. (Add. at 83-105, 163.) 
Following the termination of both cases, Puttuck filed the complaint that is the 
subject of this appeal. He asserted five causes of action against the Gendrons: 1) 
wrongful use of civil proceedings; 2) civil perjury; 3) obstruction of justice; 4) abuse of 
process; and 5) civil conspiracy. (Add. at 5-11.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court should affirm the dismissal of Puttuck's complaint because it does not 
state a claim under Utah law. Contrary to Puttuck's assertion, the Gendrons never 
asserted any counterclaims against Puttuck, which is fatal to his wrongful use of civil 
proceedings and abuse of process claims. Moreover, Utah does not recognize civil claims 
for perjury or obstruction of justice. Additionally, Puttuck did not plead the Gendrons 
had a meeting of the minds to accomplish an unlawful act, which is necessary to state a 
claim for civil conspiracy. Finally, even if Puttuck had sufficiently pleaded his claims, 
they would be barred by the statute of limitations. 
Further, the Court did not abuse its discretion denying Puttuck's request to amend 
his complaint because he did not submit a proposed amended complaint or a 
memorandum explaining what he would amend and why amendment was necessary. 
Absent such, there was no basis for an amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PUTTUCK'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF. 
None of Puttuck's five claims provide a basis for liability. 
A. Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings and Abuse of Process 
Puttuck asserts claims against the Gendrons for wrongful use of civil proceedings 
and abuse of process. Wrongful use of civil proceedings is "the civil counterpart to 
malicious prosecution" and occurs when a party "institute[es] or maintain[s] civil 
proceedings for an improper purpose and without a justifiable basis." Gilbert v. Ince, 
3 
1999 UT 65J 19, 981 P.2d 841 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1997)) 
(additional citations omitted). Abuse of process occurs where a party "uses a legal 
process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not 
designed." Id. at I 17 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1997)) 
(alteration in original, additional citations omitted). 
Puttuck's wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process claims are based 
entirely on his assertion that the Gendrons wrongfully filed and pursued counterclaims 
against him in Puttuck L (Add. at 5-6 & 9-10.) There are no other allegations of 
wrongdoing. The only counterclaimant in Puttuck /, however, was LRG, Inc. (Add. at 
49-66.) The Gendrons did not assert any counterclaims. Therefore, there is no factual 
basis for these claims and the trial court properly dismissed them. 
Nevertheless, assuming the Gendrons had asserted counterclaims in Puttuck /, 
Puttuck's claims for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process in this case 
would still be barred. Any assertion that the fictional counterclaims were without merit 
would have been required to have been asserted in that case and would have been 
extinguished by the settlement and dismissal with prejudice of Puttuck L 
B. Civil Perjury and Obstruction of Justice 
Puttuck asserts claims against the Gendrons for civil perjury and obstruction of 
justice. This Court held in Cline II v. State of Utah, 2005 UT App 498, f 29, 142 P.3d 
127, that Utah law does not recognize either as a claim for relief. The plaintiff in Cline II 
asserted civil claims against the Division of Child and Family Services and a child 
4 
welfare worker for perjury and obstruction of justice relating to the caseworker's 
investigation of parental abuse allegations. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss 
these claims. This Court affirmed, explaining, "When a statute makes certain acts 
unlawful and provides criminal penalties for such acts, but does not specifically provide 
for a private right of action, we generally will not create such a private right of action." 
Id. (additional citations omitted). The Court continued, "The Utah Code provides 
criminal penalties for . . . obstruction of justice, and perjury, but does not provide for a 
private right of action for any of those acts." Id. 
Utah law has not created a civil claim for relief for perjury or obstruction of justice 
since Cline II was decided. Accordingly, Utah law does not recognize either, making 
dismissal of these claims appropriate. 
C. Civil Conspiracy 
Puttuck's civil conspiracy claim is based on allegations that Peter Gendron 
testified falsely during his deposition in Puttuck I and Hale and that William Gendron 
"failed and refused to disavow or reject this false testimony after having multiple 
opportunities to do so . . . ." (Add. at 3-4, 10.) 
To assert a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must plead "(1) a combination of 
two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the 
object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a 
proximate result thereof." Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, f 22-23, 
54 P.3d 1054 (internal quotation marks and additional citations omitted). 
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There is no assertion William knew Peter's testimony was false or that the two of 
them planned for Peter to testify falsely. Therefore, Puttuck failed to plead an essential 
element of civil conspiracy. 
In Waddoups, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on a civil 
conspiracy claim where the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence supporting their claim. 
Id. atffl 35-36. See also, Turville v. J&J Properties, L.C., 2006 UT App 305, f 26, 145 
P.3d 1146 (trial court properly dismissed civil conspiracy claim based on plaintiffs 
failure to plead fraud supporting the claim with particularity). Puttuck, did not even 
properly plead a civil conspiracy claim. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed 
it. 
D. Statute of Limitations 
Even if Puttuck's complaint had properly stated a claim for relief, each would be 
barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3). 
Puttuck's claims are all founded on f 19 of his complaint, which alleges: 
PETER testified that the $500,000 loss asserted in [] counterclaims were 
due to [Puttuck's] negligence and mismanagement etc. [sic] Likewise, 
under oath on other occasions, Defendant PETER testified that [he and 
others] suffered this very same loss due to Hale['s] . . . negligence and 
mismanagement, e t c . . . . and . . . substantially covered the same time frame. 
(Add. at 4.) The first testimony referred to in °J[ 19 occurred on February 23, 2000 during 
Peter's deposition in Puttuck I. (Add. at 121.) The "other occasions" both occurred in 
Hale: first in Peter's deposition on November 3, 2003 and later at trial in June 2006. 
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(Add. at 108-109.) Puttuck did not file his complaint until March 12, 2007. (Add. at 1-
12.) 
'"[A] cause of action accrues' and the 'statutes of limitations begin running upon 
the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" 
Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, ^12, 78 P.3d 616 
(quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, <[33, 44 P.3d 742). Using the Puttuck I deposition 
date, Puttuck's claims clearly fall outside the statute of limitations. Therefore, he argued 
in response to the motion to dismiss that "[i]t was only at the trial in June 2006 . . . that 
[Puttuck] knew Peter Gendron had testified falsely in February 2000." (Add. at 109.) 
"'[W]hen a plaintiff alleges that a defendant took affirmative steps to conceal the 
plaintiff's cause of action" . . . the concealment prong of the discovery rule applies to toll 
the statute of limitations on the plaintiff's claims, regardless of inquiry or constructive 
notice. Russell/Packard Development, Inc., 2003 UT App 316, % 15 (quoting Berenda v. 
Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996) and citing Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1365 
(Utah 1996)). "'[T]he discovery rule has no application' [] where the plaintiff 'd[id] not 
suggest any reason why the action could not have been filed' . . . when the statute of 
limitations expired on his claim." Id. (quoting Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 
1064, 1065 (Utah 1992)). "[I]n cases not involving allegations of concealment, inquiry 
notice on the part of the plaintiff is enough to trigger the running of the limitations 
period." Id. (citing Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51-52 (Utah 1996)) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Puttuck failed to plead any facts establishing the discovery rule applied to toll the 
statute of limitations. As held in Atwood and confirmed in Russell/Packard, failure to do 
so renders the discovery rule inapplicable. Consequently, Puttuck was on inquiry notice 
of the allegedly false testimony in Puttuck I and the statute of limitations began to run on 
February 23, 2000. Accordingly, his complaint, filed more than seven years later, is time-
barred, even if it had properly set forth a claim for relief. 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
PUTTUCK'S REQUEST TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs amended pleadings. It states 
that after a responsive pleading is served, "a party may amend his pleading only by leave 
of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). 'To properly move for leave to amend a 
complaint, a litigant must file a motion that 'shall be made in writing, shall state with 
particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.'" Holmes 
Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 57, 48 P.3d 895 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(b)(1)) (additional citations omitted). A motion for leave to amend "must be 
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities in support and by a proposed 
amended complaint."1 Id. (emphasis added, internal and additional citations omitted). 
This requirement is supported by sound public policy, including: 
(1) mitigating prejudice to opposing parties by allowing that party to 
1
 The internal citation was to Rule 4-501(l)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, in effect when Holmes 
was decided. It was subsequently replaced by Rule 7(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which also requires a 
written memorandum to accompany "[a]ll motions, except uncontested or ex parte motions . . . ." 
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respond to the motion for leave to amend, and (2) assuring that a court can 
be apprised of the basis of a motion and rule upon it with a proper 
understanding of the motion. 
Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 39 (additional citation omitted). It 
further enables the trial court to "ascertain what changes are sought and . . . whether 
justice so requires the amendment of a pleading." Id, (additional citation omitted). 
Puttuck did not file a motion to amend, a supporting memorandum or a proposed 
amended complaint. His request to amend consisted of one sentence at the end of his 
opposition to the Gendrons' motion to dismiss, which read, "PLAINTIFFS [sic] 
REQUEST TO AMEND COMPLAINT if the Court finds the need for more information 
regarding the claims asserted." (Add. at 118.) 
The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Holmes that the trial court properly refused a 
similar request to amend. Responding to a motion for summary judgment, Holmes 
argued: 
"In the event this Court determines that Holmes' Complaint fails to 
adequately plead the claims and causes of action addressed above, Holmes 
moves this Court for leave to amend its Complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Case law interpreting Rule 15 
recognizes that the rules of Civil Procedure liberalize pleading requirements 
and require that the parties be afforded the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they may have pertaining to the dispute. Rule 15 
further requires that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." 
Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f 38 (internal citation omitted). 
Affirming the dismissal, the Court explained, "Holmes's abbreviated requests for leave to 
amend its complaint 'lacking . . . statements] of the grounds for amendment and dangling 
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at the end of [its] memorand[a, do] not rise to the level of a motion for leave to amend.'" 
Id. at f 40 (quoting Calderon v. Kansas Dep't ofSoc. & Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 
1186 (10th Cir.1999)) (alterations in original). The court therefore concluded that the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the request. 
Similarly, Puttuck' s abbreviated request appeared only in passing at the end of his 
memorandum opposing a dispositive motion, did not state with particularity the basis for 
the proposed amendment and did not identify what it would be. In short, there was 
nothing that provided the district court with any basis to conclude that justice required 
amendment. Accordingly, the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the 
request to amend. 
III. THE GENDRONS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR COSTS IN 
RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states, "[I]f a judgment or order 
is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered . . . ." Rule 
34(a), Utah R. App. P. (emphasis added). Because the order of dismissal should be 
affirmed in its entirety, the Gendrons are entitled to recover their costs and request that 
the Court enter an order awarding those, the amount to be determined by the trial court in 
accordance with Rule 34. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Gendrons respectfully request that the Court 
affirm the dismissal of Puttuck's complaint and award them their costs incurred in 
defending against this appeal. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Gendrons 
respectfully request that the Court conduct oral argument. 
DATED this Zj_ day of February, 2008. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Hatfold G. Christenser 
HeatherJS; White 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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